A Computer Scientist’s Reactions to NPfIT by Randell B
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMPUTING 
SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Computer Scientist’s Reactions to NPfIT 
 
 
B. Randell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-1024 May, 2007 
NEWCASTLE
UN IVERS ITY OF
TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 
              
 
No. CS-TR-1024  May, 2007 
 
 
A Computer Scientist’s Reactions to NPfIT 
 
 
Brian Randell 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper contains a set of personal views relating to NHS Connecting for Health’s 
National Programme for IT (NPfIT), and in particular its Care Records Service, 
written from the point of view of a computer scientist, not a medical informatics 
expert. The principal points made are as follows: 
Centralisation: Pulling lots of data together (for individual patients and then for large 
patient populations) harms safety and privacy – it is one by-product of excessive use 
of identification when in fact all that is usually needed is authentication. Large 
centralized data storage facilities can be useful for reliability, but risk exchanging lots 
of small failures for a lesser number of much larger failures. A much more 
decentralised approach to Electronic Patient Record (EPR) data and its storage should 
be investigated. 
Evolutionary acquisition: Specifying, implementing, deploying and evaluating a 
sequence of ever more complete IT systems is the best way of ending up with well-
accepted and well-trusted systems – especially when this process is controlled by the 
stakeholders who are most directly involved, rather than by some distant central 
bureaucracy. Thus authority as well as responsibility should be left with hospital and 
general practitioner trusts to acquire IT systems that suit their environments and 
priorities – subject to adherence to minimal interoperability constraints – and to use 
centralized services (e.g., for system support and back-up) as if and when they 
choose. 
Socio-technical Issues: Ill-chosen imposed medical IT systems impede patient care, 
are resisted, result in lots of accidental faults, and lose user support and trust. All 
these points are attested to by rigorous studies involving expertise from the social 
sciences (psychology, ethnography, etc.) as well as by technical (medical and 
computer) experts – much more attention needs to be paid to such studies, and more 
such studies encouraged. 
Constructive Reviews: A constructive expert review, working closely with 
Connecting for Health, could be very helpful, but should be evidently independent 
and open and thus essentially different in nature to past and current inquiries. A 
review of this nature could not just recommend appropriate changes of plan, and 
speed progress. It could also contribute to the vital task of helping to restore the trust 
and confidence of the public and the media in the programme and in the government 
officials involved. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper contains a set of personal views relating to NHS Connecting for Health’s National 
Programme for IT (NPfIT), and in particular its Care Records Service, written from the point 
of view of a computer scientist, not a medical informatics expert. The principal points made 
are as follows: 
Centralisation: Pulling lots of data together (for individual patients and then for large patient 
populations) harms safety and privacy – it is one by-product of excessive use of identification 
when in fact all that is usually needed is authentication. Large centralized data storage 
facilities can be useful for reliability, but risk exchanging lots of small failures for a lesser 
number of much larger failures. A much more decentralised approach to Electronic Patient 
Record (EPR) data and its storage should be investigated. 
Evolutionary acquisition: Specifying, implementing, deploying and evaluating a sequence of 
ever more complete IT systems is the best way of ending up with well-accepted and well-
trusted systems – especially when this process is controlled by the stakeholders who are most 
directly involved, rather than by some distant central bureaucracy. Thus authority as well as 
responsibility should be left with hospital and general practitioner trusts to acquire IT systems 
that suit their environments and priorities – subject to adherence to minimal interoperability 
constraints – and to use centralized services (e.g., for system support and back-up) as if and 
when they choose. 
Socio-technical Issues: Ill-chosen imposed medical IT systems impede patient care, are 
resisted, result in lots of accidental faults, and lose user support and trust. All these points are 
attested to by rigorous studies involving expertise from the social sciences (psychology, 
ethnography, etc.) as well as by technical (medical and computer) experts – much more 
attention needs to be paid to such studies, and more such studies encouraged. 
Constructive Reviews: A constructive expert review, working closely with Connecting for 
Health, could be very helpful, but should be evidently independent and open and thus 
essentially different in nature to past and current inquiries. A review of this nature could not 
just recommend appropriate changes of plan, and speed progress. It could also contribute to 
the vital task of helping to restore the trust and confidence of the public and the media in the 
programme and in the government officials involved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper contains a set of personal views relating to the National Programme for IT 
(NPfIT), the NHS project which has claimed to be “the world’s biggest civil IT 
project” [Brennan 2005]. This claim is indeed believable, since the statistics are 
staggering – the 10-year project is intended to serve “40,000 GPs, 80,000 other 
doctors, 350,000 nurses, 300+ hospitals, 50m+ patients, and 1.344m healthcare 
workers” [Ferrar 2006], with “expenditure on the Programme expected to be £12.4 
billion over ten years to 2013–14” [PAC 2007]. 
It must be borne in mind that I am not myself a specialist in medical IT systems – I 
became interested in NPfIT in April 2006 when I was invited to add my signature to 
an open letter to the House of Commons Select Committee on Health calling for an 
inquiry into the programme’s plans and progress. A brief investigation of a number of 
published articles and reports readily convinced me to sign. Since then, I have found 
myself spending a considerable amount of effort on tracking NPfIT, and assembling a 
dossier of published concerns and other relevant documents related to it1. 
Why am I doing this? The main reason is that I care deeply about the NHS. Without it 
I wouldn’t be here today. I had an emergency triple cardiac bypass seven years ago, at 
almost the exact age that my father died of a heart attack, and have nothing but praise 
for all the medical staff and organisations involved. (One of the same hospitals also 
undoubtedly saved the life of one of our sons, some years earlier.) I strongly believe 
they all deserve more and better IT facilities, so am very supportive of the general 
aims of NPfIT. But, along with my fellow signatories, I have become increasingly 
concerned at what I’ve been able to learn during this last twelve months, admittedly 
as an outsider, a mere computer scientist, about the directions and progress of this 
programme, and in particular about those aspects of NPfIT concerned with Electronic 
Patient Records (EPRs), such as the National Care Records Service (NCRS) and the 
local NHS Care Records Services. 
The background I bring to this is a long-term interest in system structuring, and in 
particular in system reliability and security, a subject that I took up shortly after I 
moved from a position at the IBM Research Center in the States to become Professor 
of Computing Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. This was in 1969, 
not long after I had been involved in the first NATO Software Engineering conference 
[Naur 1969]. This conference led to an upsurge of research into formal development 
of provably correct software, but led me to wonder if it was possible to mitigate the 
effects of software faults that might remain in deployed systems despite such efforts. 
As a result, soon after joining Newcastle colleagues and I obtained a first research 
grant from the Science Research Council as it was then called, and so launched a still-
continuing and growing programme of research concerned with computer system 
reliability and security. The emphasis over all these years has been on how to ensure 
that complex computer systems are adequately trustworthy even though they might 
(indeed will) suffer from faults. Such faults can be ones of design of both hardware 
and software, of hardware manufacture, of system operation and of careless use – 
including, and lately especially, what one might term “malicious faults”, arising from 
the activities of vandals, criminals and terrorists. Moreover, a further cause of 
possible failure, i.e. another type of fault, is that of a project failing to keep up with 
                                                
1 http://nhs-it.info/ 
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changes to requirements during system development and/or deployment. (Thus my 
central interest is what is termed “system fault tolerance”.)  
In 2000 I helped to initiate the six-year five-university Dependability Interdisciplinary 
Research Collaboration (DIRC)  which was led by my Newcastle colleague Cliff 
Jones. This recently-completed (and very successful) project, involved computer 
scientists, psychologists, ethnographers, statisticians and others, in total some 85 
researchers. Its subject was the reliability and security of large systems of computer-
based systems (i.e. systems made up of computers and people) – much of the research 
in this project, in fact much more than originally planned, concerned health care 
systems, including EPR systems. Undoubtedly, my involvement in this project, from 
which I learned a great deal about the importance of socio-technical issues in system 
design, has coloured my attitudes to NPfIT, and hence the comments I make in this 
paper. 
The April 2006 letter to the Health Select Committee, which in the end carried the 
signatures of 23 senior academics specialising in computing and systems, received far 
more publicity than any of us expected. Subsequently I was one of seven signatories 
who accepted an invitation to meet Dr Richard Granger and his senior staff to discuss 
our concerns. (Dr Granger is the Director General of IT for the NHS and Chief 
Executive of Connecting for Health (CfH), which is the organization within the 
Department of Health that is responsible for NPfIT.) At this meeting Dr Granger 
agreed that a constructive open independent review of the type we had urged could be 
of benefit to NPfIT, and a press release to this effect was issued by CfH.  
At this time we also received a request from the Health Select Committee to provide 
them with suggested Terms of Reference for the proposed review – see Appendix. 
However it was only in late 2006 that the Health Select Committee, reversing an 
earlier decision, decided to hold an inquiry into NPfIT. This inquiry in fact is 
concentrating on one crucial aspect of the NPfIT, namely its plans and provisions 
concerning Electronic Patient Records, an inquiry that we hope will lead to a full 
technical review of the programme as a whole. 
As a consequence of the written submission ([HC 2006], Ev164) that I made to this 
inquiry on behalf of the Group of 23 Signatories, I received an invitation to testify at 
one of the inquiry hearings. In order to prepare for this hearing I drafted an extensive 
set of notes, purely for my own use. However, I was subsequently urged by 
colleagues to produce a version of my notes for publication – hence this paper. 
NPFIT AND THE CURRENT SCEPTICISM SURROUNDING IT 
“The National Programme for Information Technology in the NHS (the 
Programme) is a ten year programme which presents an unprecedented 
opportunity to use Information Technology (IT) to reform the way the NHS 
in England uses information, and hence to improve services and the quality of 
patient care. The core of the Programme will be the NHS Care Records 
Service, which will make relevant parts of a patient’s clinical record available 
to whoever needs it to care for the patient. . . The Programme’s scope, vision 
and complexity is wider and more extensive than any ongoing or planned 
healthcare IT programme in the world, and it represents the largest single IT 
investment in the UK to date.” [NAO 2006] 
“The central vision of the Programme is the NHS Care Records Service, 
which is designed to replace local NHS computer systems with more modern 
integrated systems and make key elements of a patient’s clinical record 
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available electronically throughout England (e.g. NHS number, date of birth, 
name and address, allergies, adverse drug reactions and major treatments) so 
that it can be shared by all those needing to use it in the patient’s care. . . The 
stakes are high. If it succeeds in its aims, the Programme could revolutionise 
the way the NHS in England uses information, and make significant 
improvements to the quality of patient care. But if it fails, it could set back IT 
developments in the NHS for years, and divert money and staff time from 
front line patient services.” [PAC 2007] 
NPfIT is a “system-of-systems” consisting of a set of interlinked systems, some 
provided at national level (i.e. for England as a whole), others provided by Local 
Service Providers (LSPs) who between them serve Primary and Secondary Care 
Trusts (i.e. hospitals and general practitioners) throughout five English geographical 
regions. The main national level systems are: the National Network for the NHS (N3), 
the National Data Spine (which forms the core of the National Care Records Service, 
and incorporates the Personal Demographics Service and the Secondary Uses 
Service), Choose and Book, NHSmail, the Electronic Prescription Service (EPS), the 
Picture Archiving and Communications System (PACS), and the Quality 
Management and Analysis System. LSPs provide data warehousing, applications and 
services for all the trusts in their respective regions, such as local NHS Care Records 
Services, and PACS solutions that connect to the National Data Spine. 
There are many reasons why there is now much scepticism among the general public 
and in sections of the medical world about NPfIT: 
• There have been so many occurrences of widely-publicised failures of large IT 
systems in the UK and elsewhere, for example resulting in great cost and 
schedule over-runs or even complete abandonment, major reliability problems, 
or massive security lapses, e.g., resulting in the leaking of literally millions of 
credit card numbers. 
• There is the Information Commissioner’s Report “What Price Privacy” [ICP 
2006] indicating how easily reporters and inquiry agents can illicitly obtain 
information from the Police National Computer System and other allegedly-
secure government systems. 
• Closer to home, there is the recent very embarrassing Medical Training 
Application Service (MTAS) blunder, in which confidential personal data 
from hundreds of junior doctors’ job applications were made available on the 
Internet – one of the causes of the humiliating suspension of the service in 
May 2007 [e-Health 2007a]. 
With regard to NPfIT itself, there have been numerous reported reliability problems. 
These include the two day outage at CSC’s Maidstone data centre, and privacy 
failures (such as at the Melton, Rutland and Harborough PCT [e-Health 2005], and at 
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust [Collins 2006]). There have also been well-
publicised surveys of doctors expressing their concerns about the programme (e.g. [e-
Health 2007b, Medix 2006]), the publicity over the Helen Wilkinson case [Evans 
2006], etc. And the NCRS, which many have regarded as the “central vision of the 
Programme” through its intended provision of shared electronic patient clinical 
records, has very recently been found by the House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts to be “already running two years behind schedule [since] the introduction of 
clinical as opposed to administrative software has scarcely begun; indeed, essential 
clinical software development has not been completed” [PAC 2007].  
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Moreover the way that officials and ministers have dealt with such problems has been 
quite counter-productive. A notable example is the initial demand by the Department 
of Health that doctors provide them with the names of people who wished to opt-out, 
and then the misleading official statement that assured the public that they could opt 
out of having their summary care records uploaded, without mentioning that they had 
no option regarding the uploading of their detailed care records [Anderson 2006]. 
ACHIEVING SAFETY AND MAINTAINING PRIVACY 
Whether a medical IT system, such as an Electronic Patient Record (EPR) system, is 
adequately safe or not depends both on how well the system requirements, both 
current and future, have been identified and specified, and how well the system meets 
these requirements, i.e. how reliable and secure it is. However, identifying a medical 
information system’s possible safety hazards (and comparing them to the hazards – 
which undoubtedly will also exist – of not using an IT system) is a matter for medical 
experts. 
They will know how critical the accuracy and timeliness of particular information is 
likely to be to a clinician in a given situation, what would be the implications of a loss 
of, or a long term unavailability of, say, an entire hospital’s patient records, how 
dangerous could be confusions caused by badly designed computer display screens, 
etc. They should also be able to assess how such potential new dangers compare to 
existing dangers (such as the fact that paper records can be difficult to retrieve or even 
locate). These are matters outside my area of competence, as are issues such as 
whether there is greater likelihood of over-reliance on EPRs, as compared to paper 
records, merely because they come from a computer. However the need for clarity 
and precision regarding safety and privacy requirements is within my competence. 
Achieving IT system reliability and security in pursuit of safety, and providing 
guidelines as to what levels of reliability and security are achievable (i.e. what types 
and frequencies of failure should – unfortunately – have to be allowed and planned 
for) are issues for computer experts. (No complex IT system is completely reliable 
and secure – so-called experts who claim otherwise should be shown the door.) Thus 
consideration of safety issues must involve the combined expertise of medical and IT 
specialists. 
Like safety issues, privacy issues, such as the confidentiality of patient records, 
require the combined efforts of two types of expert – experts in the law, medical 
ethics, public policy, etc., on the one hand, and IT experts on the other, in order to 
determine the system requirements. The role of the IT experts will centre on 
explaining the possible privacy-related implications of both the chosen functional 
requirements placed on the IT system (e.g., whether the system has adequate 
provisions for protecting patient identities), and of the possible failures of the system 
(e.g., the likelihood of accidental or deliberate leaking of potentially-compromising 
information about a celebrity and the possibility of sabotage by disaffected 
individuals). However, there is a valuable overlap in that there are some experts who 
have the necessary knowledge of what is likely to go wrong and what shouldn’t be 
able to, of data protection, etc., and also of technical security mechanisms such as 
cryptography and access control. 
It is vital to have a detailed specification (agreed by suppliers and users alike) not just 
of what a system is supposed to do, but how well it is supposed to do it. In other 
words there needs to be a statement of the “guaranteed” reliability and security levels 
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of the various technical services to be provided to users by the NPfIT system, e.g., 
concerning the possibility of confidential information being widely leaked from 
EPRs, of EPR data being corrupted or lost, or of access to EPRs being unavailable for 
unacceptably long periods. 
System reliability and security specifications, like the functional specifications, will 
need agreed amendment from time to time. Such specifications are as necessary at 
each stage of an evolutionary system procurement process as they are in situations 
where the (usually misguided) aim is to produce a complete system specification ab 
initio (i.e. one that it is assumed will guide the rest of a huge and lengthy development 
project). 
Such specifications are needed not just as part of contract negotiations, but in order 
that users can be informed and prepared for the incoming system, and their support 
for it gained. Indeed, in properly-run projects well-written agreed specifications play 
a crucial role as the main channel of communication between the users and the 
developers, two communities that tend to speak quite different languages. 
I was surprised to find, when I first started investigating NPfIT, that no such 
specifications were publicly available. I and my colleagues were then amazed to 
learn, from Dr Richard Granger himself, that CfH themselves do not have detailed 
reliability and security specifications for the various major NPfIT systems (including 
those related to EPRs). This is because these specifications are regarded as 
confidential by the suppliers! (I cannot imagine the Ministry of Defence buys its 
aircraft without knowing beforehand how fast they are supposed to fly, or how often 
they will need servicing.) In the absence of such specifications, when all it has are 
technically vague and incomplete contracts, with “agreements to agree”, CfH is in a 
much weaker position vis-à-vis its suppliers than is generally admitted, and the users 
are not provided with the detail which would enable them to provide informed views. 
However reliability and security specifications alone are not sufficient. For any 
significant safety-critical system (which NPfIT most certainly is) the norm is to 
require that the system suppliers provide a “safety case”. By this is meant a 
comprehensive and well-argued set of documents, providing credible evidence 
demonstrating that the agreed safety-related reliability and security specifications will 
be met, subject to identified (and agreed) fault assumptions. (For example, it might 
well be acceptable to assume that smart cards used for user authentication are in 
practice tamper-proof, or that cryptographic software that has been both formally 
verified and exposed to public assessment is indeed faultless. However, there will 
always be assumptions and it is very important that these are – as far as humanly 
possible – identified and agreed beforehand.) 
In the absence of such safety cases and equivalent documents related to privacy 
protection, CfH staff have to put all their faith in the competence of the system 
suppliers, and the user population their faith in CfH’s ability to assess this 
competence. Moreover both CfH and the users then have to await (and suffer) early 
and perhaps lengthy trials and several successive early deployments of the systems 
before they can gain any significant and justifiable confidence that the systems are 
likely to prove adequately reliable and secure. (This is quite apart from any questions 
of the systems’ functionality, usability, etc.)  
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THE NATURE OF THE CHALLENGES FACING NPFIT 
Like any large IT system, a large EPR system is a socio-technical system, not just a 
mere technical one. The extent to which it actually meets safety and privacy 
requirements depends on people, as well as on hardware and software. People (users, 
operators, etc.) can be both a cause of, and a means of preventing or minimising the 
impact of, safety- and privacy-compromising failures.  
Reliability and security, and hence safety and privacy, are “weakest link” properties. 
The larger the system, the more people involved, the easier it will be, for example, for 
an unscrupulous reporter or private investigator to find a weak link in the form of a 
legitimate user who can be fooled into committing, or bribed to commit, an act which 
will breach the system’s privacy rules. (An experiment some years ago at the North 
Yorkshire Health Authority showed that about thirty phone calls were received each 
week attempting to trick staff into revealing confidential information [HC 2006], 
Ev65. Incidentally, though such callers can be prosecuted should they be caught, lazy 
or corrupt insiders have little to fear from the law.) 
On the other hand, doctors and nurses will, when they feel it necessary, find ways of 
undertaking their tasks despite the computer system. If security controls are too time-
consuming they will be evaded, as exemplified by the recent case of smart-card 
sharing in response to excessively slow logging-in procedures at the South 
Warwickshire General Hospitals Trust [Collins 2006]. Another simple example, 
identified and studied by the DIRC project, was that of ward managers learning how 
to fool an ineffective automated bed management system into supporting a bed 
management policy that fitted their requirements [Clarke 2002]. 
Although intelligent and dedicated people are often driven – albeit at considerable 
inconvenience – to find workarounds that more or less adequately solve their 
immediate clinical needs, the wider consequences of those workarounds for overall 
system management can be adverse and unacceptable. Indeed, research studies have 
shown that all sorts of workarounds become the norm in situations where users have 
had what they regard as an unacceptable system thrust upon them from on high, 
resulting in an overall system that is quite dysfunctional from the viewpoint of the 
managers and bureaucrats, even if clinical needs are being met [Eason 2006].  
In fact there have been quite a number of careful scientific studies of health care IT 
systems, and in particular EPR systems, which have demonstrated the vital 
importance of socio-technical issues. One issue is the impact an EPR system can have 
on medical practice. To quote a detailed scientific study of the working of 
Community Mental Health Teams [Hardstone 2004]: 
“It would seem that integrated care records systems are, in the main, 
modelled along the same lines as airline reservation systems – always online, 
and always up to date. While this model may have its advantages in that it 
increases organisational control and enables strict auditing (what information 
was recorded in the system at a particular time and who had access to it), it 
fails to acknowledge and support the kinds of professional practices we have 
described.” 
Another study is of the introduction of IT into an A&E department, which involved 
replacing existing whiteboards with PC-based computer systems. It was found that, 
although the technology supported simple information requirements, complex co-
ordination, collaboration and awareness issues were left unsupported [Broome 2005]. 
And a study in the context of UK psychiatric healthcare services revealed “important 
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discrepancies between the assumptions of the role of the [EPR] and the ways that 
healthcare professionals actually use and communicate information within the 
particular work setting studied” [Hartswood 2003]. 
In summary – it is sheer folly to specify and design a complex IT system such as a 
large EPR system with inadequate consultation and commitment from the various 
classes of people who will affect and be affected by it. Indeed there is an official 
international standard, ISO 13407, which provides guidance on achieving quality in 
use by incorporating user-centred design activities throughout the life cycle of 
interactive computer-based systems – I have seen no evidence that CfH requires its 
suppliers to adhere to this standard. 
To quote another study [Adams 2005]: 
“Traditional design and implementation approaches, isolated from 
communities, produce users – both clinicians and patients – who are either 
unaware of the technology or perceived it as complex and inappropriate for 
their needs. Random deployment of technology within communities, with 
poor design and support, is perceived by many as complex, inappropriate for 
their needs and a threat to current roles and practices, including the 
maintenance of clinician–patient relationships.” 
It is equally folly to assume that one can correctly determine the functional, reliability 
and security specifications of a complex system at the outset, then deliver the 
completed system in a standard form to numerous institutions and assume that people 
can be trained and convinced, i.e. bullied, to use it “properly”. (A well-disciplined 
military unit might, just might, manage this but the NHS cannot.) It is also foolish to 
try to bulldoze unwilling staff into organisational change by imposing computer 
systems on them – recall the London Ambulance Service debacle [Finkelstein 1996]:  
“This system was to supplant the existing manual system. . . The entire 
system descended into chaos (one ambulance arrived to find the patient dead 
and taken away by undertakers, another ambulance answered a ‘stroke’ call 
after 11 hours - 5 hours after the patient had made their own way to hospital). 
. . The Chief Executive of the LAS resigned. . . the implementation approach 
was ‘high risk’; inappropriate and unjustified assumptions were made during 
the specification process; there was a lack of consultation with users and 
clients in the development process with knock-on consequences for their 
“ownership” of the resulting system; the poor fit of the system with the 
organisational structure of the ambulance service. . . there is a very strong 
message in the report about the attempt to change working practices through 
the specification, design and implementation of a computer system.” 
Let me quote two of the conclusions from the Official Report of the Inquiry into the 
London Ambulance Service [SWTRHA 1993]: 
“c) the Computer Aided Despatch system implemented in 1992 was over 
ambitious and was developed and implemented against an impossible 
timetable; 
d) LAS management ignored or chose not to accept advice provided to it 
from many sources outside of the Service on the tightness of the timetable or 
the high risk of the comprehensive systems requirement.” 
Let me also quote two conclusions from a major multi-university study of EPR 
systems in practice [Proctor 2007]: 
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“The NHS has seriously underestimated the scale of the task involved in 
deploying EPRs. Constantly changing government and NHS policies has led 
to EPR procurement being very protracted: requirements have to be 
continually re-drawn and re-shaped and [this] often leads to unsatisfactory 
compromises. Procurement is also made problematic because these systems 
will be used as instruments of significant organisational change. However, the 
Trusts (and the NHS itself) do not have a concrete idea of what the results of 
those changes will lead to, consequently it is very difficult to assess system 
suitability. 
Although ‘supporting medical practice’ and ‘patient centred’ are twin mantras 
of EPR design in the NHS, an over-riding design emphasis is on 
implementing ‘proper’ process, and on coding medical and administrative 
procedures ‘correctly’ so they may be standardised, counted and reported on. 
These ‘other’ requirements that stem from the need to provide fully 
technically and organisationally integrated systems can actually disrupt 
current medical practices. Standardisation implies that some features of local 
practice will be re-configured around new models that may run contrary to 
the way staff organise and understand their work; technical constraints can 
reduce flexibility. Since these ‘other’ requirements must be met, support for 
tried and tested local work routines may be removed with serious 
consequences later down the line.” 
As mentioned earlier, system specification, development and deployment should be 
gradual (“evolutionary”) activities, with adequate provisions for assessment, feedback 
and re-adjustment of plans – a well-known aphorism is “A complex system that works 
is invariably found to have evolved from a simple system that worked” [Gall 1975]. 
Gradual deployment alone is not sufficient. The activities should start with relatively 
simple uncontroversial plans for systems that can be successfully deployed and can 
gain everyone’s support and trust. Indeed in general IT system specification, design 
and installation should be part of an overall business process re-engineering plan. 
It is not surprising therefore that numerous voices are now arguing that it would have 
been much better if CfH had concentrated first on enabling individual trusts to acquire 
new or improved EPR systems that suited their particular circumstances and priorities 
(subject to minimal guidelines aimed at facilitating planned future interoperability). It 
could then have sensibly deferred attempting to construct nation-wide or LSP-wide 
EPR “systems-of-systems” until the individual trusts’ systems were well established 
and accepted.  
This approach is in line with the idea, now gaining ground, that the concept of an 
EPR should be abandoned in favour of that of using an “information broker” to enable 
the accessing of information that is gathered as appropriate for each particular 
purpose from multiple specialised record repositories. Such a broker can be regarded 
as implementing what are in effect “virtual EPRs”. In fact CfH already endorse one 
software system – Miquest [CfH 2006] – that works this way, extracting data from 
different types of general medical practice computer systems, and this is the approach 
taken very successfully in Israel by Clalit Health services (“the largest health 
organization in Israel and the second largest in the world”) [Gilon 2003]. Moreover, 
the information broker approach has been shown to fit well with the use of modern 
system-building technologies such as web services and XML [Budgen 2007]. 
In identifying possible system requirements it is also vital to avoid placing excessive 
reliance on any complex critical system, especially one with demanding safety and 
privacy goals such as the National Care Records System. Some of the most successful 
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complex systems owe their success not just to their high reliability and security, but 
also to the care that has been taken to minimise any absolute need for excessively 
high reliability or security – one very successful and well-documented example of this 
is the VISA international electronic payments system [Stearns 2006]. 
Given that complex IT systems will invariable fail on occasion, it is critical in 
determining what services are to be provided by a system to consider how the 
surrounding organisation will manage to cope when the system fails [Schneier 2000]. 
For example, since EPRs will certainly be leaked and patient confidentiality breached 
on occasion, and possibly on a grand scale, it is vital to have procedures in place 
beforehand by means of which victims can gain prompt redress, and those responsible 
can be traced and penalised. (Unfortunately the Caldicott Guardian scheme [DoH 
2007], which might be assumed deals with such matters, is such that security breaches 
are not reported to patients, but only to the relevant Caldicott Guardians, and who I 
am told have much responsibility but little power.) 
Similarly, there need to be robust plans about what to do if and when EPRs, or other 
critical patient records, become inaccessible for an undue period or data is lost (as has 
happened recently at the Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre [Bowers 2006], and in Milton 
Keynes General Hospital [Gibson 2007] for example). 
THE IMPACT OF CENTRALISATION AND SCALE 
There are great dangers to centralisation (whether physical or logical), and of “single 
points of failure”, as opposed to using large numbers of relatively isolated small 
systems, the failures of any one of which would have relatively limited effect. So a 
cardinal rule is to try to avoid having any “single points of (major) failure”. Instead, 
physically and logically distributed systems, employing carefully architected 
redundancy and diversity measures, are greatly to be preferred. (A quite different but 
also often important consideration is that the management of large centralized 
facilities tends to be much less responsive to the diverse needs of their various sets of 
“customers” than are the managers of specialised local facilities.) 
Centralisation (at Local Service Provider (LSP) level, leave alone national levels) 
results in such massive databases, and user populations, that it inherently risks major 
(reliability or security) failures, from any of a variety of possible causes. Instead of 
having breaches of patient confidentiality, or loss of records, affecting just patients of 
individual GP surgeries, if these records are all pooled and hosted by an LSP a single 
accidental fault, or a single careless or malicious act, affecting a central server and its 
network and overwhelming whatever protective facilities have been provided could 
have a disastrous effect on all the surgeries and all their patients, in a whole region. 
For example it has been reported that the recent failure at CSC’s Maidstone data 
centre left clinicians throughout the West Midlands and the North-West without 
access to their patients’ computer records for the entire two-day outage [e-Health 
2007c]. (It is worth pointing out that each LSP is intended to have responsibility for 
patient numbers that are comparable to the populations of various medium-sized 
European Union member states!)  
This is not to say that all GPs and hospitals should be left to cope unaided with the 
responsibilities of maintaining their patients’ records reliably and securely, or that 
failures will not occur at the surgery or hospital level. Centralised back-up facilities, 
for example, could be very valuable, especially if the backed-up data is encrypted, 
and all the key holders can be trusted. Unfortunately, my colleagues and I have been 
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unable to find any published discussions regarding NPfIT of such architectural issues, 
and of the trade-off decisions that are such a vital part of any competent large design 
activity. 
The above points are technical ones concerning reliability and security – but they are 
being made against a background of there being significant controversy within the 
medical profession over the alleged clinical benefits of wide-spread access to either 
complete or summary EPRs. This provides an additional reason for questioning 
whether the evident technical risks of developing large (in effect highly centralised) 
“systems-of-systems” tasked with maintaining up to date widely accessible EPRs are 
worthwhile, even at LSP leave alone national level. 
Concerns over the confidentiality of detailed patient records in NPfIT have led to the 
idea of centralising just what are termed “summary care records” (though there is 
evident controversy concerning just what should be included in, and the clinical utility 
of, such summary care records), and to using a “sealed envelope” scheme in order to 
allow patients more control over the use made of detailed and their summary records. 
However a consultancy report – commissioned by CfH from Det Norske Veritas – 
determined that if a sealed envelope scheme were developed and used, it would be 
better employed locally, not as part of a huge centralised EPR repository [e-Health 
2006]. 
One further point – safety considerations indicate a need to design systems in such a 
way as to ensure (or at least to encourage) high data quality. The best way to do this is 
to arrange that electronic patient records be updated as an immediate by-product of 
clinical activities, so that these activities can directly benefit from such data capture, 
e.g., through the immediate detection of prescription errors. (Equivalent practices are 
well established in other application areas.) In contrast, data that is collected 
afterwards and which is mainly used just for other purposes (e.g., summary care 
records) will never be of the same quality, or utility, because it will be of much less 
concern to the clinicians. (Note however that we’re told that many senior staff still 
just won’t use computers – touching keyboards is beneath them. If you insist that such 
a consultant uses the machine himself he will retire, emigrate or cheat.) 
A critical aspect of the NPfIT system is that of “identity management” – how 
information about users’ and patients’ identities is collected, maintained and used. In 
fact in the computer world there are two very distinct approaches to “identity 
management”. Large commercial and government organizations assume that it is their 
responsibility and right to collect, and own, and exploit identity information (whether 
this is to do with patients’ health, customers’ buying habits, or citizens’ behaviour), 
and this is what they mean by “identity management”. The alternative view is that 
individuals should be the managers of their identities, exercising control (subject to 
legal safeguards) as to who is allowed to see and make what use of information about 
them. (This point is well argued in a recent report by the Royal Academy of 
Engineering [RAE 2007].) This view leads naturally to being careful to distinguish 
between “identification” and “authentication”, and to use the former only when 
necessary, under very strict legal and technical controls.  
There is in fact a growing recognition that centralised identity management, and 
excessive use of identification when authentication would have sufficed, is inherently 
dangerous from the point of view of privacy protection, avoidance of identity theft, 
etc. All that a concert hall manager needs to ensure is that each concert-goer has 
obtained a ticket – there is no reason more the manager identify them. Yet NPfIT 
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makes its huge demographic database play a central role in many situations where 
much less privacy-threatening authentication methods than those currently used could 
suffice. (This point is well-made in written evidence to the Health Committee from 
the British Computer Society [HC 2006], Ev36.) 
In summary, you can collect a huge amount of valuable, readily identifiable, and 
hence at risk, information and then set about trying to protect it. Alternatively you can 
have a number of carefully segregated sets of minimal information, each under 
appropriate control. In fact the best approach is to design information services that 
will preserve privacy adequately even if some of their data servers have been 
successfully taken over by criminal gangs! Compromises are inevitable – you have to 
design for them.  
Unfortunately, the impression that colleagues and I have gained is that little thought 
has been given by CfH to minimizing the need for patient (and clinician) 
identification (as opposed to authentication), in order to mitigate privacy concerns. 
Equivalently, we question what thought has been given to allowing individual patients 
to influence or even control (e.g., with the help of their doctor) what uses are made of 
their information. (However, given that there are already a number of central systems 
such as PACS involved in patient care, probably the only affordable immediate 
possibility of providing privacy to patients is simply to let them be treated under 
pseudonyms if they wish. Otherwise the only way for them to obtain privacy will be 
to go private.) 
SECURITY MECHANISMS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
No complex IT system is completely reliable and secure. Very well-argued books 
[Schneier 2000, Schneier 2003] by Bruce Schneier, now with BT, provide much 
evidence of this. Moreover, his and other work lead me to believe that with NPfIT 
security failures are more likely to be directly due to insiders than, for example, 
criminal hackers exploiting an insecure Internet connection, though the insider actions 
may well have been engineered by plausible outsiders. 
The NCRS security plans rest on the use of such mechanisms as smart cards, role-
based access control, and software-implemented “sealed envelopes”. I do not claim to 
be particularly expert in such matters, since my security work has concentrated on 
system architecture issues, and how to cope with failures that could affect security.  
I am prepared to assume that smart cards (as part of a well-designed overall system) 
can be adequately secure for use in the NHS, though less so for high risk banking 
applications, given the possibility, which though low is non-zero, of them being 
tampered with (though it is relatively easy to clone them) and of card reading devices 
being compromised. The problems with smart cards in a health care setting are I 
believe more to do with misuse – such as sharing of cards, carelessness with pin 
codes, etc. However, though I am aware of a number of careful scientific studies of 
how NHS users have reacted to EPR and other IT systems, including ones that have 
been imposed on them, I have not found any such studies regarding smart card usage 
in health care, only manufacturers’ claims and anecdotal reports. 
The extent to which unauthorised smart card sharing can be avoided is greatly 
affected by the speed and convenience with which they can be used. The speed 
depends on the complexity of the checks that have to be carried out by the system, 
and the accessibility of the data that is to be checked. Very large, distant, systems 
provide bigger challenges to achieving speed than small local ones.  
  13 
Ideally, the speed of response of NPfIT systems should, like their reliability, have 
been publicly specified (based on careful usage studies), and guaranteed before 
implementation and deployment. In practice systems often go through numerous 
improvement cycles, before their performance is adequate, assuming it ever is. (Just 
what response times are required in what circumstances for NPfIT’s various services 
is however something that requires careful assessment and realistic controlled trials.) 
Hopefully the NPfIT response time problems are ones that can be solved. I would 
point out that smart cards seem to work well for bar staff who are sharing a till in a 
busy bar. But persuading bar staff who are working on commission to authenticate 
themselves using their smart cards each time they wish to register a sale is I assume 
much easier than persuading a busy A&E consultant to use his/her smart card 
properly. It is also much easier to provide the bar staff with a very fast and simple 
user interface.  
Role-based access control, used to support the BMA security policy, has I understand 
proved adequate for maintaining privacy in modest-sized EPR systems [Denley 1999] 
– though I do not claim to be particularly expert in such matters. I question, however, 
the practicality of role-based access control in very large and heterogeneous 
organizations such as the NHS. If there were relatively few roles, and role changes, 
then the technical problems of managing roles, and of verifying that role assignments 
are in line with security policy requirements, would perhaps be manageable – but it is 
very doubtful that this would be the case in the huge “system of systems” that is 
NPfIT.  
A further mechanism to be employed is that of sealed envelopes – this mechanism, 
which typically employs cryptographic techniques, ensures that information held 
“within” the envelope cannot be accessed until the envelope has been “unsealed”, a 
carefully-audited action that can only be carried out by authorised individuals. My 
understanding is that NPfIT’s sealed envelope scheme is still being specified, so I 
assume that the exact scheme (and with security the devil is in the details) is both 
novel and untried, though the basic idea of an electronic equivalent of a sealed 
envelope, e.g., for digital signatures, is well-known. However I note that the 
Federation for Information Policy Research, whose security expertise I greatly 
respect, said in their written evidence [HC 2006] Ev 63: 
“Sealed-envelope systems have not been built, and it is not clear that they can 
be.”  
In fact achieving security (in particular maintaining confidentiality) in systems of the 
size of regional (LSP) or national level data repositories is I believe not practicable, 
given the huge user population involved, since it is more a people than a technical 
problem.  
A fourth security technology to be employed is “anonymization”. Given a database 
with identified patient information in it, and the wish to extract information (e.g., for 
statistical or research purposes, so-called “secondary uses” in NHS parlance) from 
this database that does not need to include patient identification, then there is a need 
to anonymize the information adequately if patient confidentiality is to be respected. 
This should not just be a case of omitting patients’ names and full addresses, as it can 
be all too easy to identify an individual by pulling together separate apparently non-
sensitive information about them via a set of carefully-crafted searches.  
From a US Government Report on Privacy and Health Research [Lowrance 1997]: 
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“From a privacy-protection perspective, there is a very wide distinction 
between personally identifiable data and truly anonymized data. But in 
practice the demarcation between these extremes is not sharp. Attending 
assiduously to where particular data lie on the spectrum between them, and 
especially to data that are somewhere in the middle, is a crucial protection 
strategy. At present, large amounts of data lie in-between—they are not 
completely anonymized, but they are not readily identified, either. . . The 
power of computers to perform elaborate, powerful, rapid searches, and the 
pressures for access, mean that merely assigning simple pseudonyms affords 
little protection.” 
Complete anonymization is exceedingly difficult – and it is not at all obvious that the 
methods employed in the Secondary Uses Service (SUS) to protect demographic 
information and patient records are anywhere near adequate. Indeed, I would argue 
the need for (independent public) studies of the effectiveness of NPfIT’s planned 
anonymization schemes. A big concern is that I understand some existing SUS 
applications rely on using postcode plus date of birth, data from which many patient 
identities can be easily ascertained. So either the applications have to change, which is 
most unlikely, or the data in SUS simply will never be anonymized to any effective 
extent. In this case patients should be informed of the risk and be entitled to opt out of 
the SUS. 
It is, incidentally, worth noting that in Iceland there was a proposal to create a 
national database of health and genetic information that would not just facilitate 
healthcare but be sold to drug companies for research – it was believed that the 
exercise could pay for itself and make a profit. The proposal was to identify records 
only by means of an encrypted social security number. But it became clear that 
patients could be identified by means of suitable queries; eventually 11% of the 
Icelandic population opted out, and the Icelandic Supreme Court found (on the basis 
of the same human rights law that is the law in Britain) that the database had to 
support opt-in rather than opt-out. [Anderson 1998] 
However, it is well established that most security failures are not due to inadequacies 
in the security mechanisms employed, but to failures (such as software bugs) in the IT 
system in which they are employed, or through the actions of people involved with 
the system, and that such failures are unavoidable, and so must be coped with. (This is 
the burden of one of Professor Ross Anderson’s most frequently-referenced 
publications [Anderson 1994] – one I know well since years ago I was his PhD 
Examiner, and the paper was part of his thesis.) All experience to date thus makes it 
very evident that with huge systems of the type planned patient records would 
frequently be divulged (or corrupted, lost or rendered inaccessible), on occasion on a 
grand scale, probably grand enough to destroy all trust in the entire system. (Imagine 
the potential impact of a blunder, such as recently happened in the MTAS system to 
some thousands of junior doctors’ job applications, in the context of millions of 
patient records [e-Health 2007a].)  
To sum up, a very good summary of the fundamental security dilemma facing NPfIT 
is that one can (with difficulty) achieve any two of (a) high security, (b) sophisticated 
functionality, and (c) great scale – but achieving all three is currently (and may well 
remain) beyond the state of the art. (This is not my formulation, but I’ve no reason to 
doubt that it is of relevance to the NCRS.) NPfIT looks set to sacrifice security; I 
believe that it should instead make every effort to evade the scale problem. 
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WHAT LEVELS OF SYSTEM RELIABILITY ARE ACHIEVABLE? 
We need to distinguish between what reliability levels can be plausibly guaranteed 
and relied upon beforehand (through tests, statistical and logical arguments, etc.) and 
what reliability levels might turn out, years later, to have been actually achieved. 
The Health & Safety Executive’s Nuclear Installations Inspectorate have ruled that 
the Sizewell B nuclear power station’s computerized “emergency shut-down” system 
was sufficiently complex that it was necessary to assume that it could fail to act on 
average once every thousand times [Littlewood 2001]. (The suppliers originally 
claimed a guaranteed maximum failure rate of one in ten thousand, but HSE 
determined that this claim was not sustainable.) Don’t worry – this is not the only 
means of preventing a nuclear disaster in Suffolk!  
However, it is important to note that the Sizewell emergency shut-down system is 
trivially simple compared to NPfIT, and has had an immense amount of validation 
effort expended on it. In practice, however, this type of highly safety-critical system 
typically (but by no means always) eventually proves to be several orders of 
magnitude more reliable than was possible to predict. 
Where one has a software system that has been delivered to and used by thousands or 
millions of people, who are (willingly or unwillingly) helping to complete its testing, 
very impressive reliability figures can eventually be achieved. I understand that 
Microsoft now claim a mean time between failures of 3000 hours, i.e. about four 
months, for their Windows operating system, though I doubt if many PC users believe 
this, since there are all sorts of other things to go wrong besides the basic operating 
system. 
But NPfIT differs greatly from Windows – it is a massive one-off networked system, 
albeit constructed from a set of pre-existing (but heavily modified) sub-systems. 
Some failure rates I’ve been given for one-off networked systems (of a much smaller 
size than NPfIT) are: 
• A new military command and control system has on average been suffering 
one failure every 40 days, and a dangerous failure every five months. 
• Commercial distributed process control systems using mature hardware and 
software, as a rule of thumb, suffer total failures about once every couple of 
years.  
Given quite generous assumptions about the number of faults present in the system, 
the proportion that are dangerous, and the amount of pre-operational testing 
performed, recent reliability prediction theory [Bishop 1996] suggests there could be 
one dangerous failure every four days. This is orders of magnitude worse than the 
failure rates expected in current safety standards, where targets of one dangerous 
failure per year (or lower) are set for safety-related computer systems.  
ACHIEVING PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE 
The general public needs to trust not just the IT systems, but also the medical staff or 
government officials (present and future) who control them. In particular, they need to 
be confident that the information that is collected about them, especially if it is 
gathered together into what is in effect one huge data repository, is not misused. This 
could for example happen through this repository being subject to “mission creep”, as 
various other government departments – and indeed commercial organizations – seek 
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to exploit it. The public thus needs believable reassurances concerning what other 
systems (inside and outside the NHS) will be allowed to have access to the national 
summary care record service, and what other systems will have access to the full care 
records hosted by LSPs, under what legal controls. (The fact that recent official 
responses to concerns about patient opt-outs and the uploading of patient records have 
been found to have been deliberately misleading [Anderson 2006], and the blandness 
of official reactions to criticisms of NPfIT and NCRS from the Public Accounts 
Committee [Shifrin 2007], for example, do not augur well for any future attempts to 
reassure the public, and indeed the medical profession, regarding such matters.) 
Trust is gained slowly and can be lost abruptly – both as a result of system failures, 
and of the actions (and words) of system owners. The general public’s trust in the 
medical profession, and especially in their own GPs’ respect for their privacy, is 
typically quite high. This provides an excellent basis on which to build, incrementally, 
an IT system that will also gain the public’s trust – providing of course that the 
system gains and retains the trust of the medical profession. However, if doctors have 
systems imposed on them, systems that are under some distant control and ownership, 
then this avenue towards a well-accepted and trusted national health IT system has 
been closed off from the outset. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Let me first quote some recommendations from a Connecting for Health document – 
unfortunately, these recommendations are not from the British, but rather are from the 
American, Connecting for Health organization [CfH (US) 2006]: 
It is desirable to leave to the local systems those things best handled locally, 
while specifying at a national level those things required as universal in order 
to allow for exchange among subordinate networks.  
Avoid “Rip and Replace”: Any proposed model for health information 
exchange must take into account the current structure of the healthcare 
system. . .  
Separate Applications from the Network: . . . The network should be designed 
to support any and all useful types of applications. . .  
Decentralization: Data stay where they are. . . [this] leaves judgments about 
who should and should not see patient data in the hands of the patient and the 
physicians and institutions that are directly involved with his or her care.  
My own most confident recommendation concerns the vital urgent need for an open 
constructive review of NPfIT, and in particular the NCRS, by independent, including 
international, experts. This would need to cover, indeed be centred on, reviewing the 
specification by clinicians and by safety and privacy experts who know what is 
wanted, and simultaneously by technical people who can assess whether the proposed 
architecture and systems will deliver it.  
Such a review is something that my colleagues and I first urged last April. At the 
time, in response to a request, we formulated and provided the Select Committee with 
suggested terms of reference (see Appendix). In the light of developments since then 
we now regard a review of the type we described as even more necessary.  
It is worth recalling that when we first proposed such a review Dr. Richard Granger 
accepted that such a review would be worthwhile, and CfH issued a press release to 
this effect. A constructive review of the type we envisage would in our opinion be a 
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help rather than a hindrance, if carried out properly. Moreover, if the reviewers were 
evidently independent and well qualified, the review could be of great help in re-
establishing trust and confidence in NPfIT among NHS staff and the general public. 
The review would be best carried out by a smallish team, say of no more than six 
people operating full-time at least initially, who between them have expertise in all 
the main areas – medical informatics, computer system dependability, usability, 
privacy, etc. It should be undertaken in stages, since one could hope for some 
significant contributions quite early on, and the decision as to how long the review 
should continue could be taken in the light of progress. (In fact, it might be worth it 
continuing on a permanent but part-time basis on what I understand is the approach 
being used in Wales.) 
The review team should not exist in a virtual ivory tower, emerging occasionally 
brandishing reports, but should be an integral part of the Programme, in regular 
contact with CfH and continually discussing issues and findings. This is essential for 
a constructive review, and to avoid perpetuating present adversarial attitudes, and any 
danger that the team will be denied key evidence [Bennatan 2006]. (Examples of the 
sort of review we have in mind are the US Department of Defense’s scheme of 
“independent and objective software and system assessments” [Baldwin 2000], and 
the “independent technical assessment” schemes of the Mitre Corporation [Clapp 
2003] and the Software Engineering Institute [SEI 2004], well-established schemes 
that have successfully rescued numerous large IT projects.) Incidentally, such a 
review might also result in long-term recommendations that could help to avoid 
similar problems in future massive government IT projects.  
My expectation is that such a review would provide support for my view (indeed 
many people’s view) that specifying, implementing, deploying and evaluating a 
sequence of ever more complete IT systems is the best way of ending up with well-
accepted and well-trusted systems – especially if this process is controlled close to the 
coalface, rather than by some distant central bureaucracy. (Mere evolutionary 
deployment, which is all that CfH is attempting, is insufficient.) Thus authority as 
well as responsibility should be left with trusts to acquire IT systems that suit their 
environments and priorities – subject to adherence to minimal interoperability 
constraints – and to use LSP services (e.g., for system support and back-up) as if and 
when they choose.  
Note the fundamental inconsistency of NHS trusts being encouraged by the 
Government to compete in order to improve, but being subject to stultifying central 
control in matters of IT. One can draw an interesting contrast to the situation of local 
authorities – they are all required to carry out the same functions (though not in 
competition, except to meet central government benchmarks), but can make their own 
IT procurement choices.  
Though such a change of direction would seem revolutionary, I feel it would be by far 
the best way of capitalising (to eventual splendid effect) on what has been achieved so 
far by Connecting for Health and its suppliers, and would help avoid a knee jerk 
political decision that could amount to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
My other recommendations are more tentative – all are motivated by the concerns that 
I have presented above regarding the reliability and effectiveness of the overall NPfIT 
system, i.e. the socio-technical system consisting of the computer systems, 
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networking facilities, software and people. (None are original and all could be 
reconsidered in the light of the review findings.) 
1. First ensure that individual trusts have well-established and well-trusted 
systems for their clinical records as well as for patient administrative record-
keeping needs, suiting their particular circumstances and priorities (while 
giving due attention to issues of interoperability). Only then attempt to evolve 
gradually into having an adequately integrated overall system. There is thus a 
need for (evolutionary) central standards for interoperability of local systems, 
standards that will encourage (but not constrain) development of improved 
functionality and usability of these systems. 
2. Reassess the current architectural approach to information sharing, 
determining the extent to which it would be feasible to move away from 
centralized databases of identifiable information, to sets of separate databases, 
each designed (by specialisation and the use of cryptography) to minimise its 
utility to an identity thief, bound together into one or more overall virtual 
databases. Thus work towards abandoning the idea of an actual EPR as such, 
in favour of virtual EPRs, each providing access to data appropriate to its 
purpose, and only this data.  
3. In specifying EPR-related systems, give suitable precedence to patient and 
clinician needs and preferences over support of bureaucratic oversight and 
management, and where appropriate develop these systems and their 
specifications via a sequence of (evaluated) operational “prototype” systems. 
4. Investigate how to reduce the extent to which demographic information is 
used directly for authentication purposes, both locally and nationally, when 
other more secure methods could be used instead. In the mean time allow and 
facilitate the use of pseudonyms where necessary. 
5. Insist that all software developed specifically for the NHS is open (i.e. that its 
source code is available for general inspection) and the property of the NHS, 
and that all off-the-shelf software and systems purchased by the NHS have 
open (functionality and dependability) specifications. 
6. Identify established systems that are ‘fit for purpose’ and consider these as 
building blocks for development, not as “brownfield sites” [e-Health 2007d] 
that impede the deployment of standard solutions. 
7. Allow patients to decide (typically via their GPs) the extent to which 
information about them should be made widely available, and the uses that can 
be made of this information. (This recommendation is motivated by the 
practical need to gain people’s trust and hence cooperation, not in order to 
support “privacy fascists”, to use Dr Richard Granger’s delightful term [HC 
2007], p.23.) 
8. Make effective use of existing, and commission further, research into socio-
technical aspects of EPR systems. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I must reiterate that I claim no expertise in medical informatics, and have had no 
direct involvement with NPfIT. (To avoid any misunderstanding, I should also make 
it clear that I have no wish to take part personally in the technical review that I and 
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my co-signatories are advocating.) Any assessment by an outsider such as myself of 
NPfIT’s plans and progress is very difficult, due to the Programme’s size and 
complexity, the secrecy regarding detailed system specifications, and the atmosphere 
of fear that prevents many NHS staff from expressing criticisms. Such knowledge as I 
have gained of NPfIT has been through my work on the Dossier of Concerns2 that we 
have assembled from a large variety of sources, ranging from newspaper articles to 
refereed scientific papers, but also through correspondence and conversations with a 
number of NHS staff who unfortunately feel a need to remain anonymous, such is the 
atmosphere surrounding the development of NPfIT.  
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE 
The Review should be pragmatic and constructive, and is intended to assist the NHS 
to achieve its overall aims. As a contribution to establishing confidence in both NPfIT 
and in the review itself, the review will be an open one. The final report and any 
interim reports will be published, and evidence given to the review will be made 
publicly available as far as possible. The review will be guided by an international 
expert advisory board. The review will undertake the following tasks. 
1. Determine the detailed specifications that presently define the technical goals 
of the NPfIT systems, and examine the processes through which these 
specifications have been shown to meet the needs of all the users of the 
systems. 
2. Consider the architectural approach that has been adopted to meet these 
specifications, in particular regarding the decisions made concerning 
centralised versus federated approaches to system construction, and the 
replacement or reuse of existing applications. 
3. Assess the mechanisms used to control system evolution and manage change, 
assess the gap remaining between user requirements and system specification, 
and establish whether the rate of specification change is increasing or 
decreasing. 
4. Assess whether the detailed technical architecture and application designs will 
deliver systems that match both the required functional aspects of those 
specifications and the required dependability aspects (safety, privacy, 
availability, reliability, accuracy, performance, usability, fault tolerance, and 
modifiability); if appropriate suggest necessary improvements. 
5. Review the programme’s plans and budgets to assess whether appropriate 
resources are available for development, process prototyping, pilot studies, 
modifications, interfacing with existing systems, roll-out, training, data 
cleansing and maintenance. 
6. Review NPfIT risk management and consult with stakeholders to uncover 
major obstacles that could jeopardise the successful implementation of the 
new system and associated work practices; where appropriate, suggest 
possible ways to overcome these obstacles. 
Notes 
1. The Review should encompass the work of both National and Local Service 
Providers. 
2. In order to perform its functions, the review team should have access to all 
information available to the Secretary of State. 
3. It shall include a formal public consultation conducted under Cabinet Office 
guidelines. 
